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I. Introduction
The Somali Peace Conference sponsored by the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), held in Kenya in 2003–05, was
dominated by warlords and partisan mediators.1 It endorsed a political
strategy whose objective has been to recreate Somalia as a clan-based
federation. Advocates of this approach claim that such a dispensation
will approximate the society’s pre-colonial tradition and therefore has
the best chance of restoring peace. An argument put forward in support of this agenda is that Somalia’s former governments, particularly
the military junta, misused public power by favoring and rewarding
certain genealogical groups.2 Proponents contend that formally and
openly using genealogical divisions as a basis for distributing public
appointments and resources will prevent future clanist favoritism. This
approach to political reconstruction mimics Ethiopia’s seemingly novel
political project, which divided the country into nine “ethnic provinces” in 1991.3 In the case of Ethiopia, the presumed rationale for this
political strategy was to overcome past domination of the state by one
ethnic group, rather than to revert to an old tradition. The imposition of
Amharic culture and language on Oromos, Somalis, Afars, the people
of the southern region, and other groups throughout the state—and
the denial of their human rights—rationalized re-engineering the new
order. The challenge for Ethiopia post-1991 has been how to undo past
subjugation without reifying cultural differences politically.4 Dividing
each country into administrative units based on ethnic belonging, the
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proponents argue, will promote democracy and produce a civic order
in which no one ethnic group or clan dominates others.
The Ethiopian and Somali developments depart from the African
nationalist project that recognized tribal and ethnic political divisions
as colonial instruments intended to facilitate imperial rule. These two
cases are indicative of a growing and troubling political trend in the
continent that turns cultural differences into state-driven political projects. In an ironic historical twist, some African leaders and previously
dominated communities have endorsed cultural politics that mimic
the colonial era, during which ethnic groups were segmented into
political clusters (or tribal reserves). Elsewhere, individuals have been
disenfranchised due to their supposed ethnic roots. For example former Zambian president Fredrick Chaluba attempted to deprive Kenneth Kaunda, his predecessor and the leader of the country’s national
liberation struggle, of his citizenship by claiming that Kaunda was a
foreigner. Similarly, the current Ivorian president sought to rob the
country’s former prime minister of his citizenship in order to ensure
that the latter could not challenge him for the presidency. Reinventing
past colonial tradition has inspired not only sectarian political entrepreneurs but also an intellectual and development industry centered
on “ethnic conflict resolution.”5 This enterprise, whose major concern is defining ethnic identity in the context of political crisis, draws
directly or indirectly on colonial social anthropology.
This essay presents a British court case to illustrate the arguments of
two competing schools of thought in Somali Studies: one that defines
Somali political conflict as quintessentially traditional clanism and its
opposite, which contests the conflation of political discord with genealogical differences. The central bone of contention in this debate is
the nature of Somali political identity. One thesis claims that Somalis
consist of ethnically distinct groups and that any political, social, or
professional association among Somalis should balance its membership, if it is to be legitimate, on the basis of these distinctions. The contrary scenario posits that Somalis are one ethnic group sharing broad,
regionally based cultural and social values but differentiated into several genealogical groups. Those who advance this thesis contend that
transforming Somalis’ genealogical differences into political, social,
and professional instruments will destroy values they share and will
undermine their sense of civic belonging. Furthermore, they add that
accepting genealogical variation as the basis for political intercourse
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and public policy is not part of the old Somali tradition but a legacy of
the colonial strategy of “divide and rule.”
The essay is divided into four sections. The first briefly sketches an
influential recent contribution to the debates regarding the nature and
dynamics of African cultural and political identity. This intervention,
which builds on an old discourse in anthropology that dealt with the
relationship between power and ideas, is vital if one is to productively
navigate through the current dialogue on identity and political crisis
in Somalia. The second section provides a snapshot of recent debates
in Somali Studies that attempt to explain the origins of the country’s
political crisis. It identifies the philosophical differences between the
two main theses in the debate centered on identity. The dominant theory in Somalist discussions asserts that indifference to the centrality of
clan identity in public affairs has been a major factor in Somali political
crises. Advocates argue that the current predicament can be resolved
by recognizing “traditional” clan identity as the foundation stone for
the reconstruction of legitimate political and professional life. Opponents posit that Somalia’s calamity is a product of the politicization of
genealogical difference and that the remedy to this crisis is to remove
genealogy from state-driven politics. They note that recent experiences
indicate that a clan-based strategy will only deepen divisions among
Somalis rather that healing the discord. The third section presents a
case heard before a British tribunal that demonstrates the critical difference between the two schools, as represented by the expert testimony of British social anthropologist I. M. Lewis and geographer Abdi
I. Samatar. Each testimony is reproduced verbatim to avoid misrepresentation and is introduced by a short paragraph highlighting its key
points. Finally, the conclusion draws on the significance of the case for
studying Somali society, identity, and politics.
II. Culture, Politics, and the Genealogy of Ideas
It is not a matter of dispute that social anthropology emerged as a distinctive discipline at the beginning of the colonial era, that it became a
flourishing academic profession towards its close, or that, throughout
this period, its efforts were devoted to a description and analysis carried
out by Europeans, for a European audience of non-European societies dominated by European power. And yet there is a strange reluctance on the part
of most anthropologists to consider seriously the power structure within
which their discipline has taken shape6 (emphasis added).
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The social sciences and anthropological analyses of post-colonial societies have gone through a sea change since Talal Asad wrote that seminal essay in 1973. Central to Asad’s intervention was the significance
of political and economic power in understanding the dynamics of
“native societies” and the effects colonialism has had on local traditions and on the ways non-Western anthropologists studied such societies. Mahmood Mamdani, in a landmark study, reignited this debate
by accentuating the enduring legacy of European political domination
of Africa.7 The core of Mamdani’s argument is that colonial restructuring of African societies conflated political and cultural identities in the
continent by turning Africans into tribal subjects administered through
“traditional authority,” and Europeans and other non-natives (such as
Indians) into races governed by civil law. A major consequence of this
schema was that although non-Europeans in Africa were discriminated
against, and despite the fact that they had cultures different from the
“master” race, nonetheless they were considered part of the civilized
community.8 By contrast, Africans who shared similar cultures were
divided into separate tribal traditions:
[E]ven if races were as different culturally as whites, Asians, and Arabs,
they were ruled under a single law, imported European law, called civil
law. Even if their languages were similar and mutually intelligible, tribes
were governed under separate laws, called customary laws, which were
in turn administered by ethnically distinct native authorities. With race,
the cultural difference was not translated into separate legal systems.
Instead, it was contained, even negotiated, within a single legal system,
and was enforced by a single administrative authority. But with ethnics,
the case was the opposite: cultural difference was reinforced, exaggerated, and built up into different legal systems and, indeed, separate
administrative and political authorities. In a nutshell, different races were
meant to have a common future; different ethnicities were not.9

The enduring effect of this political strategy was to fragment Africans into separate groups in such a way that each “group” related
subordinately to the master race and its state. Opportunistic distribution of favors among the tribes by colonial authorities, combined with
uneven peripheral capitalist development, ensured the reproduction of
political boundaries between “ethnic groups.” Over time, these identities gained a reality and logic of their own, defined in relation to state
authority and the distribution of public resources. Mamdani contends
that colonial powers sowed the seed of a new politics laced with a
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reactionary view of tradition. He insightfully characterizes Western
colonialism as the beginning of a new fundamentalist order:
[C]olonial powers were the first fundamentalists of the modern period.
They were the first to advance and put into practice two propositions:
one, that every colonized group has an original and pure tradition,
whether religious or ethnic; and two, that every colonized group must
be made to return to that original condition, and that return must be
enforced by law. Put together, these two propositions constitute the basic
platform of every religious or ethnic fundamentalism in the postcolonial
world.10

Mindful of the risk that his analysis might be misunderstood, he
accentuates the crucial difference between non-statist cultural traditions and those centered on state power:
It is not that ethnicity did not exist in African societies prior to colonialism, it did. I want to distinguish between ethnicity as cultural identity—
an identity based on shared culture—and ethnicity as political identity.
Ethnicity as cultural identity is consensual, but when ethnicity becomes
political identity the legal and administrative organs of the state enforce
it. After making a distinction between ethnic groups, between those considered indigenous and those not, these organs proceed to discriminate
against them…The distinction between cultural and political identities
is important for this argument. As a rule cultural identities are noncoercive, consensual, voluntary, and can be multiple…A legal identity is not
voluntary nor is it multiple. The law recognizes you as one, and as none
other. Once it is enforced legally cultural identity turns into a legal and
political identity. Such an identity cannot be considered a vestige of tradition because of its ancient genealogy, nor can it be dismissed as just an
invention of the colonial power because of its legal enforcement.11

This rearticulation of the distinction between the old non-statist traditions and their colonial reincarnation is a vital idea to remember in
order to grasp the historical origins of the current resurgence of ethnic
politics in Africa.
Mamdani’s intervention, informed by the experience of either settler
societies of East and Southern Africa or those societies hosting significant “non-African” immigrant populations with wide cultural differences, does not exhaust the imprint of colonial rule on Africa. Colonial
and post-colonial political identity was tribalized even in those African societies that shared common linguistic, religious, economic, and
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other social morés. The form such politicization of ethnicity took was
different from that described in Mamdani’s work, since colonial and
post-colonial authorities could not anchor this new identity on distinct language or other cultural differences. Instead, they selected an
element of the old culture, such as genealogy, that appeared to differentiate groups from one another. Once genealogy was identified as
the basis of colonial political organization, native relations with the
state were mediated through community elders transformed into state
vassals, the tribal chiefs.12 Further, uneven commercialization of the
pre-colonial economy induced differentiation between regions and,
consequently, between genealogical groups. These two processes generated competition between groups for colonial favors, which fostered
their perceived ethnic dissimilarity. The colonial project was paradoxical, however, since it not only generated the ethnicization of politics
and administration but also instigated changes that undermined it.
Both colonial education and the commercialization of the economy
became major driving forces in uniting Africans to challenge European
domination and discrimination. Entrepreneurs and professionals who
were denied access to opportunities for accumulation and advancement, and rural producers who were onerously exploited through
taxes and market interventions, joined efforts across “tribal” or genealogical divisions to mount the nationalist project.
Although independence was a critical benchmark for African liberation, many in the movement did not realize that colonialism had
changed their traditions in ways that could undermine the nationalist
project.13 The vital issue for Africans was how to overcome the aforementioned two elements, which reinforced each other: uneven development and ethnic politics. Many post-colonial leaders, despite their
commitment to the nationalist project, internalized the logic of uneven
development and ethnic politics, overtly or otherwise, and deployed
the latter when others challenged them for leadership positions.14 In
other words, their nationalism defined their political identity only if
they were secure in their positions of power. Examples of exceptions
to this pattern include leaders from Botswana, Somalia, and Tanzania. Many leaders’ conditional commitment to the nationalist project
instigated two tendencies in post-colonial African politics: one strove
to create national belonging anchored in a civic identity, while its converse peddled exclusivist ethnic politics. Even in countries where the
civic project has been successful, such as South Africa and Botswana,
ethnic politics have not disappeared, and rearguard struggles continue
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between the two agendas. Elsewhere on the continent, where ethnic
politics became dominant, social and economic disasters have invariably become the legacy of liberation. In extreme cases, the outcome has
been catastrophic, as in Rwanda and Somalia.
III. The Somali Conundrum
In spite of the enormous advances made in Africanist scholarship
since the early 1970s, Somali Studies remained locked in traditional
social anthropology. I. M. Lewis, one of the defenders of the old school
against the onslaught of critical anthropology in the early 1970s (noted
in the volume edited by Asad), has been the dominant figure in Somali
Studies. In contrast to the advances pertaining to the study of power,
politics, culture, and identity, Lewis’s conventional ideas of genealogy
and tribes (clans) have reigned supreme in Somalist scholarship.15 Elsewhere on the continent, African scholars became significant contributors to intellectual production, but Somalis had to wait until the late
1980s and early 1990s to engage these debates and write about their
own society.16 In addition to the few Somali writers, a new generation
of scholars began to emerge as political/economic calamities engulfed
Somalia over the past two decades. They recognized the limited analytical scope of traditional social anthropology to illuminate the Somali
challenge, and this predicament compelled them to look into the conceptual toolbox of African and Third World studies. Their search culminated in the discovery of social history and political economy as
a new theoretical tradition in Somali Studies. This discovery created
the basis for an alternative to social anthropology for grappling with
Somali reality, particularly in such matters as politics, development,
culture, and identity.17
The first major Somali contribution to the new theoretical tradition was Ahmed I. Samatar’s Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality
(1988). Developments in theoretical thinking in social history, political
economy, and dependency theory inspired this study. Although the
book was a clear and substantial theoretical departure from the social
anthropological and modernist tradition, it did not explicitly single out
Lewis’s framework for criticism. But a year later came an open Somali
challenge to that framework.18 This contribution contested the veracity
of Lewis’s concepts and its ahistorical interpretations of Somali social
and political history:
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The principal thrust of his analysis of the (de)composition of precolonial
Somali society and the contours of its current social geography…the
Lewisan interpretation…assumes that the…evolution of Somali society
has been quantitative in nature despite its articulation to and integration
into colonial empire…Symptomatic of this view is the unproblematic
deployment of such important and theoretically loaded concepts as the
state, tribalism, and pastoralism transhistorically.19

Since these early rumblings, four new analytical threads have
emerged. These are regional social historical studies;20 gender and
race;21 political economy;22 and cultural investigations.23
The collapse of the Somali state and the disintegration of political
and civic order in 1991 challenged both old and new ways of studying Somali society, but very few writers responded imaginatively to
the test. Much of the post-1991 production reinforced the old scholarly
tradition, maligned nationalism,24 and went further to argue for fragmenting the nation into discrete tribal fiefdoms. Indeed, some authors
divided Somalis into warlike tribes and peaceful communities,25 not
realizing that their prescriptions reinforced the very divisions that had
brought about the misfortune, while some analysts redeployed the
tribalist thesis.
In 1994, Ahmed I. Samatar took the lead in casting a schema for
comprehending the transformation of the old Somali tradition.26 In a
path-breaking essay, he mined Somalia’s collective cultural memory
and presented an innovative reading of the essence of the kinship
tradition without turning it into that anthropological fossil, the clan.
Somali identity is thus conceived of as a product of several mutually
constitutive forces whose roles are historically and socially contingent. Among these are language, genealogy, Islam, traditional social
contract (Xeer), and a mode of economic reproduction. Some of these
factors were exclusive, such as male genealogy (tol), while others were
inclusive (xidid); some were localized, while others were broader in
their reach and scope. Further, new elements were added to the repertoire, while others were re-emphasized and still others declined in significance, as the Somali community’s fortunes necessitated. The central
point to underscore is that Somali identity and tradition were never
determined by any one element but were always a living and ongoing process resulting from multiple interactive forces.27 These complex
processes generated the regional variations—for example, dialects and
cuisine—that were the hallmark of Somali tradition. For instance, diet
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in the cultivated regions of the northwest and the south, and in the
coastal settlements, was different from the more pastoral areas of the
north and central regions, while poetry, language, religion, and dress
were national in scope.
In a parallel vein, Lidwien Kapteijns took up the most neglected
aspect of the social structure, namely gender.28 Her ongoing project
has opened up fresh and exciting venues for research aimed at better
understanding old historical contours as well as the rapidly changing
gender landscape the Somali catastrophe has induced, both inside the
country and in the diaspora.29 This theme has far-reaching implications for gender identity, which Somalist anthropologists have virtually ignored. A similar research agenda on race, which rarely got
scrutiny, was vigorously put on the agenda by Catherine Besteman.30
Besteman’s contribution emphasizes the significance of race as an identity marker in the Somali world.
A third theme superseded conventional analysis of the civil war
and of clan identity. It examines the struggle over land resources in
southern Somalia.31 This collection of essays edited by Besteman and
Cassanelli does not share an overarching theoretical framework. However, it does emphasize the role resource struggles played in the civil
war and how identity issues are implicated in such struggles. Unfortunately, the contributions do not distinguish between the old scarcitydriven local conflicts and more recent state-induced ones. Noting such
dissimilarity is vital, as it dovetails with the ways in which identity
and access to resources are constructed. The substantive thread that
runs through the entire text draws on a regional history whose trademark is the ebb and flow of social processes and whose elucidation is
found in the work of Peter Little.32
A related and final challenge was how to explain the link between
Somali politics, Somali culture, and the chaotic civil war. A standard
approach has been to think of the civil war as a tussle between clans.
The argument has been that the nationalist project undermined traditional clan structure by not anchoring politics and administration in
clan identity. The end result of the misplaced ambition of the nationalist movement has been the demise of the ungrounded state order.33
Building on the literature on resource struggles challenges this essentialist reading of politics and culture. Using a comparative study of
Somalia and Botswana, one piece of research has demonstrated that
two contradictory tendencies (one inclusive—civic—and the other
exclusive—sectarian) competed for dominance in national politics.
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Contrary to the clan-centered analysis, the evidence from this work
illustrates that when the civic project has prevailed in public affairs,
it reinforced legitimacy, national belonging, and democratic culture.34
Abdi I. Samatar (the author of this article) introduces the concept of
shared values as a way of underscoring that the crisis was induced
not by nationalism but by clanism.35 The argument is that the cultural
values Somalis shared were necessary but insufficient to sustain the
country unless the authorities reinvested in those values in the form
of inclusive and democratic institutions. The Botswana and Somali
evidence confirms the claim that national institutions that are inclusive prevent divisive politicization of cultural traditions and the resultant social and political fragmentation. Conversely, when sectarian or
clanist politics became the lifeblood of public affairs, the consequences
have been ruinous.
Faced with the above developments, Lewis, the doyen of the old
school, endeavoured to turn back the intellectual clock by arguing in
familiar terms that the marginalization of the clan in national affairs
has led to the favoritism that hobbled the nation.36 He advanced the
proposition that a Somali’s belief in the clan structure defines his fundamental political identity. Consequently, any attempt to rebuild a
national political order must reflect clan divisions among Somalis if
the new government is to survive and have legitimacy. The creation of
a confederation of clan states, therefore, is the best expression of Lewis’s political advocacy, which, ironically, dovetails with the demands
of sectarian politicians, warlords, and faction leaders. Thus far, Lewis
has been unable to explain how politicized genealogical differences
will pave the way for a national dispensation whereby all Somalis are
citizens with equal rights. This silence is especially peculiar in light of
the malice of politicized clan fiefdoms in different parts of the country
since the early 1990s.
Lewis not only elevates the saliency of clan identity, but has revised
some of his earliest writings on Somali society in order to provide
a cultural (ethnic) rationalization for his clan-based political project.
His revisionist thesis that Somali genealogical groups are distinct cultural/political clusters echoes colonialist perceptions as described by
Mamdani.37 Lewis’s attempt to fuse genealogical and political identity
collided with political-economy and social-historical approaches in a
British employment court in 2001. The case, which involved a claim
of employment discrimination at the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), took on added meaning because of its broader potential
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political ramifications. The question before the tribunal was this: Are
Somali genealogical groups different ethnic and racial communities? While
mindful that the court is not the proper arena in which to resolve the
intellectual tussle between the two paradigms, nevertheless, this case
highlights an important moment in the debate that has far-reaching
implications for public life in Somalia.
IV. The Case
The BBC Somali Service, a branch of that organization’s World Service,
has been broadcasting programs in the Somali language since 1957.
The organization’s Somali employees are mainly announcers, while
the producers and management were mostly British until recently. The
first Somali manager to oversee the section, Mohamed Abdillahi, was
appointed in the early 1990s. Somali journalists employed by the BBC
had hitherto had one of two types of contracts: long-term and casual.
Senior African Service management decided in 2000 to streamline
Somali Service staff; they abolished casual contracts and consolidated
those positions into three long-term posts.38 Simultaneously, three
members of the Somali Service competed for the top job, and the management appointed Yusuf Garaad, the youngest candidate, to head the
service.
All former casual employees could reapply and compete with
outside applicants for the new full-time appointments. The search/
examination process had three parts: application letters and résumé
evaluations; written and voice tests; and, finally, formal interviews in
person or by telephone. The written test and the interviews took place
in several locations in Europe, Africa, and North America. Garaad
and the BBC’s personnel officer screened 200 application letters and
résumés. They short-listed 160 of the applicants, including seven of
the eight former casual employees who applied. The next step in the
procedure was for those who were short-listed to take the written and
voice tests. Candidates’ names were removed from the answer sheet
and replaced with code numbers. Garaad and Abdillahi Haji, a veteran senior producer in the Somali Service, graded the examinations.
The two evaluators divided the test papers into two sets, and each
graded one set of the papers. They then agreed to a short-list of 35 candidates.39 Of the 35 candidates who qualified for a final interview, six
were former casual employees. Garaad and Kari Blackburn, the manager of the BBC’s Africa Service, jointly conducted the interviews and
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selected the top four applicants, one of whom they placed on a reserve
list. Blackburn and Garaad were in complete agreement on the list of
top candidates.40
At this time, Garaad expressed concern that former employees who
were not successful might lodge complaints. Moreover, he told Blackburn that they could be accused of favoritism as a result of the finalists’
common genealogical pedigree. Garaad’s remarks did not alarm Blackburn.41 The BBC announced the examination results soon after Blackburn and Garaad made their decision in Mogadishu. To everyone’s
surprise, none of the BBC’s former casual employees were among the
winners. The top-ranked candidates were little-known young journalists who hailed from the same genealogical group in the south of the
country as Garaad.
The surprising success of three unknown journalists who shared
common ancestry with the Somali Section head created fertile ground
for speculation and political machination. Shortly after the BBC
announced the results, stunned former casual employees claimed that
the search/examination process was rigged. They accused Garaad of
nepotism and petitioned the BBC authorities to investigate their claims.
The heads of the Africa and Middle East Service and the World Service
conducted two separate investigations and announced that the search/
examination process was conducted professionally and fairly. Shortly
thereafter, former casual employees mobilized their communities in
London and organized demonstrations outside Bush House, the site
of the BBC World Service. To register their displeasure with the selection results, many demonstrators chanted “Throw out the warlord.”
The demonstrators’ reference to the “warlord” had a double meaning.
First, they wanted to highlight the genealogical link between the head
of the Somali Service and one of Mogadishu’s notorious warlords, General Aideed. Second, they intended to convey to the authorities that
Garaad, like his “kinsman” warlord in Mogadishu, arbitrarily used
public power to reward his genealogical group. Although this strategy
had little traction and failed to convince senior management of the
Africa and World Services to reconsider their decision, Garaad was
shaken by the comparison.
Former casual employees sought redress in an employment tribunal
after they exhausted BBC’s internal appeal process. They claimed that
Garaad had given undue advantage to the successful candidates by
favoring his own genealogical group and that this had resulted in their
unfair dismissal because of their clan identity. Further, they contended
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that this amounted to racial or ethnic discrimination on the basis of
clan affiliation.42 Because of the claim of ethnic or racial prejudice, the
tribunal instructed each side to engage an expert witness in order to
establish whether discrimination on the basis of clan affiliation could
come under the purview of the British Race Relations Act of 1976.43
The applicants (petitioners) retained I. M. Lewis, a retired professor of
anthropology from the London School of Economics and a renowned
expert on Somalia. The BBC engaged Abdi Ismail Samatar, a geography professor at the University of Minnesota with Somali expertise.
The two experts produced several reports describing the role of genealogy or “clans” in the constitution of Somali identity. Through their
lawyers, Lewis and Samatar exchanged several reports that the tribunal studied to make its final decision. The expert witnesses were also
cross-examined before the tribunal.
V. The British Race Relations Act of 1976
The British Race Relations Act of 1976 establishes the legal understanding of ethnic and racial discrimination in the United Kingdom. This Act
legally defines what constitutes an ethnic or racial group. According to
the Act, an ethnic group must regard itself, and be regarded by others,
as a distinct group because of certain fundamental characteristics. Two
of the key features a group must possess to be considered an ethnic
group are (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as
distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which keeps
it alive, and (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and
social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with
religious observance. The Act also identifies a number of other relevant
features of an ethnic or racial group. One or more of these characteristics will commonly be found and will help to distinguish the group
from the secondary community. They include:
• either a common geographical origin or descent from a small number
of common ancestors;
• a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group;
• a common literature peculiar to the group;
• a common religion different from that of neighboring groups or from
the general community surrounding it; and/or
• a history of being an oppressed minority or a dominant group within
a larger community.44
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The applicants and respondents asked their expert witnesses to
answer the following question: Do Somali clans constitute different
ethnic groups or races? Lewis’s and Samatar’s briefs were to explain
whether Somali genealogical groups form distinct ethnic/racial groups
in accordance with the British Race Relations Act, not to judge whether
the BBC Somali Service had engaged in discriminatory practices in
its hiring process. What follows reproduces the two expert witnesses’
written submissions.45 The materials appear in the order in which they
were delivered. Lewis wrote the first submission, Samatar responded,
and then a series of responses and rebuttals followed.46 Lewis and
Samatar were not in direct contact and exchanged their pieces via the
respective attorneys. In order to avoid any possibility of misrepresentation, each submission is presented here verbatim. The only insertions
are footnote numbers and italicized words to highlight a point.
VI. The Experts’ Arguments
Lewis fired the first shot by stressing that clan affiliation has singularly defined Somali identity, irrespective of historical era. His written
testimonies did not directly confront the question the tribunal posed in
reference to the British Race Relations Act by providing clear examples
of how the four “major” genealogical groups (Hawiye, Darod, Dir,
and Rahan Weyn) satisfy the Act’s tenets. Instead he contended, in
his first submission, that Somali clans constitute distinct ethnic and
racial groups, contrary to his early scholarship (1961, 1988, 1993).47
Four broad ideas guide Lewis’s first submission. First, he conflates
genealogy with clanist politics and the associated recasting of Somali
identity. This enables him to claim a changeless nature for Somali identity. Second, the submission indicates that the Somali nationalist project was misplaced, since it attempted to deny the centrality of clan
identity. Third, Somalis trained in the West are Westernized unless
they conform to his idea of the “native.” Accordingly, Westernized
Somalis deny their clan identity, just like the nationalists, and fail to
comprehend the traditional rootedness of Somali character. (He does
not quite explain how Lewis “the Westerner” is able to discern this
culture.) Fourth, each clan or “descent group” has unique features
that naturally predispose its members to look down on non-members.
Thus, Lewis is able to deny critical regional commonalities shared by
different genealogical groups, such as dialect and mode of life. Further,
he attempts to play down the significance of intermarriage.48
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VII. Lewis’s First Submission
Dear Mr. Hanley:
You asked me for information about Somali clans, how they operate, their Somali context to identity based on “ethnicity” or race. I am
happy to provide this since this is a form of social and political organisation on which, as a professional Social Anthropologist, I have been
specialising for almost fifty years. I have published a great deal on this
type of kinship organisation in technical anthropological books and
journals including my paperback textbook, Social Anthropology in Perspective. It is also described and analysed in its Somali context in detail
in my A Pastoral Democracy which has recently been republished. I
have in fact written numerous books (the most recent Saints and Somalis) and over a hundred articles in learned journals on various aspects
of Somali society.
I find that I am generally regarded internationally as the leading
academic authority on Somali issues, and am frequently consulted by
governments and the media on Somali matters. My academic position
is Emeritus Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics (London University) and I am a Fellow of the British Academy
(for fuller information, see Who’s Who entry).
I shall now try to answer your questions about Somali “clans.”
Somalis receive their fundamental social and political identity at birth49
[emphasis added] through membership of their father’s clan. Clan identity is traced exclusively in the male line through their father’s paternal
genealogy (abtirsiinyo: literally “counting ancestors,” in Somali). Children, at an early age, are taught to recite all their paternal ancestors up
to the clan ancestor and beyond that the ancestor of their “clan-family.”
This is a technical term, which I use to designate the largest clan groupings in the Somali nation, viz. Dir, Isaaq, Darod, Hawiye, and Digil and
Rahanweyn. These are the largest and most widely distributed units
within the nation. Traditionally, and still to a large extent, the Dir,
Isaaq, Hawiye and Darod clans are nomadic pastoralists, whereas the
Digil and Rahanweyn are agropastoralists who live with a mixed farming economy in the Bay Region of south-west Somalia between the
Juba and Shebelle rivers.
Despite changes associated with the growth of towns and modernisation generally, clan (and clan-family) identity remains of fundamental importance today both inside Somalia and in Somali refugee
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communities scattered around the world: Somali clans even have their
own web-sites on the internet! The Somali Republic which fell apart
in 1990/91 after the overthrow of the dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre,
fractured basically along clan lines. This was despite the fact that clan
identity had been officially outlawed under the banner of “Scientific
Socialism” and clan behaviour made a criminal offence (not, of course,
when graced by Siyad and his clan coterie).
In the course of the collapse of Siyad’s regime and the invasion of
the capital, Mogadishu, by Habar Ghadir (Hawiye) clan militiamen,
all the rival clan groups practised vicious “clan-cleansing,” as Somalis
called it by analogy with Bosnia. And at the height of the conflict in
the city, people whose clan identity was not known were challenged at
gun-point to recite their genealogies. If they came up with the wrong
pedigree, they were summarily executed, or worse.
In the 1960s earlier Somali nationalists, genuinely seeking to establish a viable national solidarity transcending clan loyalties, had hit on
the idea of treating clan identity as a thing of the past and consigning it
to history under the label “ex-clan.” This was also associated with the
totally unjustified view that clans were “primitive” and implied that
Somalis were unable to operate in the modern world. The word “ex”
was even adopted into Somali as an alternative to the Somali term for
clan. This form of what psychiatrists call “denial” did not, of course,
solve the problem in a clan-riddled society. It simply perpetuated it
under another name. Still today, some Westernized Somalis who often call
themselves “Somali intellectuals” pretend that clan is a thing of the past.
More generally, Somalis have had no difficulty in coming to terms
with the modern world materially and technologically. But there is
continuing problem in finding forms of political organisation which
are readily compatible with these traditional clan loyalties and their
extremely decentralised methods of decision-making, through longdrawn out debate in which all adult males have a right to participate
directly. Such extreme local democracy does not combine easily with central
authority.50
Thus clan loyalties remain fundamental and pervasive. People rely on their
clansmen, for support at all times and especially in contexts of clan competition for resources, power, and material well-being. They are expected to be
equally loyal in return, which can translate into clan nepotism where those in
positions of authority favour their own clansmen. These allegiances often have
a formal legal basis in Somali customary law. The security of the individual’s
person and property is guaranteed by collective compensation arrangements,
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within each clan. Accidental or violent death and injury are thus clan matters
and kinship provides insurance cover [emphasis added].51
In addition to being what anthropologists call a “descent group” in
virtue of its members’ collective descent from a common ancestor, what
then is a clan? Clan genealogies are a source of pride, and members of
the clan have a lively sense of clan superiority and distinctiveness
and potential hostility towards those who do not share their descent.
Members of other clans are regarded as outsiders and viewed with
suspicion, although these feelings may be muted in the case of clans
which, through common descent, belong to the same “clan-family” (as
defined above). Clan loyalties are also regularly supplemented by ties
based on marriage—with the wife’s clansmen and those of the mother.
Obviously each clan has its own independent history and traditions, its
own saints and shrines and their cult, and sometimes speaks a different dialect of Somali [Italics added]. Language difference is most acute
in the case of that between the speech of the Digil/Rahanweyn clans
and so-called “standard Somali” spoken by the other clan-families.
Here the difference is roughly similar to that between Spanish and
Portuguese. The names of individuals also vary somewhat on a clan
basis: it is sometimes possible to guess a person’s clan from his name,52
although this is by no means always possible.
I do not think that it is generally possible, as some Somalis say it is,
to distinguish visually between members of different clans. I would
prefer to say that clans represent invisible lines of distinction within the
Somali “nation” and since they are based on genealogies and descent,
have a biological basis comparable to racial distinctions [Italics added].
Somalis certainly see them in this light. It may seem paradoxical, but
invisibility does not detract from their many-stranded and compelling
importance in economic, social and political life. I have never encountered any Somali organisation where the clan identity of members was
not well-known and considered of crucial significance.53
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be added that Somalis are not
automatons. Clan and other kinship ties are manipulated by ambitious
individuals whose goal is personal success in material gain of power,
and as elsewhere, money is a very important lubricant in transactions
of every kind. Some successful entrepreneurs and politicians are probably quite cynical (privately) about their clan heritage which they seek
to use for their own ends, and a few exceptional individuals transcend
their clan identity. There are certainly some genuine Somali nationalists, and a few thoroughly Westernised, highly sophisticated, Somali
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academics and writers who reject their clan background.54 Ironically,
however, even such unusual figures are nevertheless assumed to be
motivated by the same clan interests as ordinary Somalis.
Given that the Somali world is fractured into clan-families and component clans, any organisation which aspires to representative credibility must patiently display a balance of clan-family members which
roughly corresponds to that of its public. It must also be firmly administered, with powerful constraints, which eliminate clan bias. This is
well understood by Somalis who assume that every Somali is a clan
partisan and that there are in principle no neutral Somalis.55 These
considerations regarding clan partiality apply particularly strongly in
times of clan conflict and political uncertainty, when people are especially sensitive to their clan identities, as in the present state of affairs
in Somalia.
I hope these comments on the nature of Somali clanship, as I see it
as a professional Social Anthropologist, are of assistance to you.
Yours sincerely,
Ioan M. Lewis FBA
Professor of Anthropology
VIII. Samatar’s Response to Lewis’s First Submission
Samatar argues that Somali genealogical groups are the same ethnic and racial
group. His thesis is that Somali identity is more complex than genealogy. The
key distinction he makes is between genealogical heritage and clan politics.
He accepts the importance of genealogy but argues that if it were the only
item needed to define a Somali’s identity, then other constituent elements of
Somalis’ social and cultural repertoire would not have developed. Thus, he
maintains that the key ingredients that defined traditional Somali identity
was shared language, culture, religion, and means of livelihood, in addition to
genealogy. Genealogy was one of these ingredients, and its role was dependent
on context. Furthermore, he notes that social and cultural variation among
Somalis is regional rather than genealogical.
June 30, 2001
Dear Ms. Youngson:
I am responding to your questions regarding the racial and ethnic
nature of Somali clans. Given my first-hand knowledge of Somali soci53
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ety and my academic credentials, I believe I am qualified to answer
your questions.
Currently, I am a Professor at the University of Minnesota’s Department of Geography in the United States. I have taught Human Geography and Somali issues since 1985. A Somali by birth, I grew up in
northern Somalia, and thus am a native speaker of the Somali language and have known intimately Somali culture. I have also done
comparative work on similar traditional societies, such as Botswana.
I also worked as a senior researcher at the Human Sciences Research
Council in Pretoria, South Africa. One of my recent books, An African
Miracle was a finalist for the 1999 African Studies Association’s Herskovits Award, which is given to the most important Africanist book
published in English. At this moment, I am working on a book examining leadership and political fragmentation in Somalia and serve as an
elected director for North America’s premier scholarly association on
Africa, the African Studies Association.
With regard to offering expert testimony, I have acted as an expert
witness in numerous United States immigration court cases dealing
with Somalis and one recent Federal court case. I was a consultant to
the Canadian Immigration service as well. It should be noted that my
first book, published by the University of Wisconsin press in 1989,
predicted the collapse of Somali political order two years before that
became a reality. This was the only prediction of its kind made by any
scholar of Somali society.
The two fundamental questions you asked me to answer are:
1. Do Somali clans belong to different races?
2. Do they constitute different ethnic groups?
The short answer to both questions is no. Let me elaborate. I start
with two quotes, one from a poet and one from a farmer, who lived
in different regions of the country. Farmers, pastoralists and poets are
doyens of Somali culture, and their understandings of their tradition
and identity mark the historical basis of my answer to your questions.
With characteristic prescience, the late Abdillahi Sultan Timaade, the
most analytical poet in post-colonial Somali history, underscored the
elevation of innocuous social difference and the social cost of fraudulent ambitions:
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Members of parliament when we assembled them in one place,
Presidents and ministers when they were elected,
Healthy minds and people we were facing the same direction,
Then came those who confused us only to milk everything for their sole
benefit,
Never to lose an electoral seat whose only intention it was,
In our rural areas they put a knife in every hand,
Those hacks who bombarded us with fake wailings of sectarian solidarity [read clanism],
The poison they injected in us killed nobility of character,
Lies and lies they garland us with, Beware. (1968)

A farmer from the southern town of Jowhar reinvoked Timaade’s
poetic explications nearly two decades later: “Son, the tribalism business is the work of the urban people. They cook it there and then serve
it to us.” (Issa, Spring 1990)
These poetic and pedestrian renderings show that the “clanist” politics that bedevil Somalia is not rooted in the society’s culture and
traditions. These two views dovetail with my own formal and informal education about the nature of Somali culture and genealogy. As
a schoolboy, I was taught (using British textbooks) that Somalis are
members of the Cushitic race in the Horn of Africa. I also learned from
those same textbooks that Somalis are a homogenous ethnic group that
speak the same language, and practice the same culture and religion.
Some scholars have referred to Somalia as Africa’s only nation-state
due to the above characteristics. Nearly all of these scholars exaggerated Somali’s homogeneity by overlooking the existence of significant
communities in the south of the country who have different histories
and social organizations. Despite such variations, the vast majority of
the people in the country share the same fundamental social, cultural
and religious values that defined the nature of traditional Somali identity: Islam, Somali language, genealogy, oral and poetic literature, Xeer
(customary law), and sharing material risks. Collectively, these traits
bounded Somali identity.
Genealogical “groups” (clans) range in size from an extended family to a collection of these at the regional and national levels. Thus,
the numbers of genealogical groups and sub-groups are contingently
defined and not determined a priori. Genealogically speaking, Somalis
can be divided into several “major” and “minor” groups. The designation “major-minor” is not based on any accurate national census.
Somali genealogical groups share Somali identity and origin. Given
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the high level of inter-marriage within and among different groups—a
characteristic feature of this culture—there are no visible and invisible
biological differences among Somalis.
Somali genealogies embedded in that old tradition, which was
grounded in inclusive shared values, must not be conflated with the
instrumentally induced recent political practice and concept—clanism.
This practice was invented by competing elite factions in their struggle
to illegitimately privatise public resources, including political power.
Clanism therefore is bereft of tradition. What seems to give clanism an
authentic hue is its organisational structure that mirrors genealogical
patterns. However, clanism is genealogy expunged from its cultural
moorings and hitched onto an opportunistic and divisive political
game.
According to the British Race Relations Act of 1976, two essential
characteristics define an ethnic group: i) It had to have a long shared
history, of which the group was conscious as distinguishing it from
other groups, and the memory of which it kept alive, and ii) It had to
have a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious
observances.
Other characteristics that could be relevant are: i) either a common
geographical origin or descent from a smaller number of common
ancestors; ii) a common language, which did not have to be peculiar to
the group, iii) a common literature peculiar to the group, iv) a common
religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general
community surrounding it, and v) the characteristic of being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a larger community. Having considered the essential and possibly relevant features
of the Act, I conclude the following about the social nature of Somali
genealogical groups: i) Each Somali genealogical group does not have
distinct history that distinguishes it from other Somalis. There has
been unsuccessful recent attempts to manufacture such history in the
context of instrumentalist and sectarian elite politics; ii) Each Somali
genealogical family lacks its unique cultural tradition, customs, manners, etc. For example, the town of Gabileh where I grew up is home
to several communities of differing “male” genealogies, but none has
a unique history. It is possible to write the history for the town and
its vicinity but not a unique cultural and distinct tradition of each
genealogical group. This equally applies to all Somali groups with the
exception of two groups, one in the south, and a minority group in the
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entire country; and iii) finally, there is no scientific and biological basis to
demarcate genealogical groups as a race. There are of course localized
and family histories among Somalis, just like all other human communities. However, none of the so-called major genealogical groups have
the unique characteristics so defined by the Race Relations Act of 1976.
Furthermore, Somali genealogical groups, large or small, do not satisfy
four of the five secondary but relevant features noted in the Race Relations Act. There is a Somali-wide language, literature, religious and
cultural practices. Some analysts who have superficial knowledge or
understanding of Somali culture and politics fail to grasp the material and ideological make-up of that society’s current political problems. They confound genealogy with elite driven sectarian politics that
pit one group against others. If genealogy was the lethal (patriarchal
blood driven) impulse then my mother should have rejected my father
and my siblings since, according to the said custom, we are members
of the potential enemy. This type of superficial analysis imputes causality to genealogy and tradition. Clanism, as the political mechanism
for manipulating community sentiment along sectarian lines, is the
force behind the Somali calamity. Genealogical differences have been
one of the elements of Somali tradition, but it never induced the kind
of mayhem that mars this society. I have recently written about this in
two British Journals (1997, 2001). The clan centered misrepresentation
of the dynamics of Somali culture and politics leads to the invention of
racial and ethnic categories that have no bearing on Somali social history. Such concocted categories best serve sectarian entrepreneurs that
profit from un-civic manipulations of normal but benign human differences. The features which the British Race Relations Act prescribes
are those which separate the Somali from their neighbours, such as
the Oromo and Afar (groups found in Djibouti and Ethiopia). The 1976
Act’s definition of race and ethnic groups does not apply to the vast majority
of Somalis.
I hope these remarks directly answer the questions. Please let me
know if you need more information on the subject.
Sincerely,
Abdi I. Samatar
Professor of Geography
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IX. Lewis’s Rebuttal
Lewis’s and Samatar’s second and third submissions include discussion of
contributions made by some of the applicants and the respondent (Garaad).
Lewis’s response to Samatar’s criticism of his first submission and Garaad’s
contribution has these points. First, Lewis tries to undermine Samatar’s academic credibility by pointing out that geographers are not experts on identity
and genealogical systems. He is able to dismiss geographers’ contributions
by reducing identity to clan and depriving Somalis of their multi-faceted and
dynamic history. He adds that Samatar has not conducted research in rural
Somalia that is relevant to issues of identity and polity as he has defined them.
Second, Lewis reiterates his claim that Somalis like Samatar are Westernized
and therefore do not understand their society and culture. Third, he introduces
his accusation that the BBC Somali Service’s news and programs are strongly
biased against certain regions and groups. He claims that recent hires have
upset clan balance in the Somali Service. Lewis intends to implicate Garaad,
the head of the service, as someone who was already guilty of professional malfeasance and lacked any integrity. Fourth, Lewis explicitly accuses Garaad of
supporting Abdiqasim S. Hassan, the president of the Transitional National
Government, without producing any evidence other than the fact that the two
belong to the same genealogical group. Here again Lewis implies the inability
of Somalis to behave professionally when such behavior affects any member of
their genealogical group.56
22/07/01
Dear Mr. Hanley:
Following the draft version sent by fax yesterday, I now write to give
you my comments on the contributions of Prof. Samatar and Mr. Yusuf
Gerad in the BBC Somali case. I don’t think they are very impressive
for the reasons indicated. In fact, they appear surprisingly hastily written and superficial. It is not surprising that Prof. Samatar should have
been approached (although he is not, in my opinion, particularly well
qualified). He is a friend of Mr. Yusuf Gerad and like him a protagonist for
the “Arta faction,” or “national transitional government” as it calls itself. I
think you are aware that Mr. Yusuf Gerad and “President” Abdulqasim belong
to the same section of the Habar Ghedir clan. As you also know, I think, the
BBC has been inundated with complaints from Somalis throughout
the world on the obvious bias which its news reports, particularly on
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the Somali Service, display in their treatment of events in Somalia. I
think these complaints are fully justified and (as I have conveyed to the
BBC management and FCO) I share the view that the BBC no longer
provides impartial reporting on Somali issues. Other Somali specialists who share my concern for the well-being of the Somali Service
have similarly made representations to the BBC—without much effect.
The obvious conclusion seems to be that the BBC management relies
unquestioningly on Mr. Yusuf Gerad to form their views on Somalia.
In view of his obvious lack of impartiality, this seems rather unwise.
1. Prof Samatar
Prof. Samatar describes himself as a Geographer. Geography is, of
course, a broad subject, but in my fifty years of university research and
teaching I have never encountered a Geographer who was expert in
the complexities of African systems of kinship and clanship which are,
as it were, bread and butter to the professional Social Anthropologist.57
Having reviewed, either in their manuscript or published versions,
most of Professor Samatar’s Somali writings, I know of nothing to suggest that he has the technical expertise to master this highly specialised
field. Nor, as far as I know, has Prof. Samatar carried out the extensive,
systematic field research in rural Somali society on this topic which
would provide the necessary raw data for such an analysis. Thus, for
example, while he asserts that modern Somali clan behaviour, which he
calls “clanism,” is a new untraditional development he has offered no
satisfactory empirical evidence to sustain this argument. Nevertheless,
clan loyalties in the modern context may indeed be more outrageously
exploited by the westernised political elite than by the clan elders in
earlier times. If so, this increases rather than diminishes the similarity
of contemporary Somali clanship with more familiar examples of manufactured ethnic and “racial” identity in, for example, the Balkans.
As a Somali, however, Professor Samatar naturally has direct personal
experience of Somali culture and social organisation which informs his writing. His position in this respect is similar to that of any other member of
the westernised Somali elite,58 as for example, Mr. Yusuf Gerad or the
BBC Applicants (one of whom, Mr. M.H. Sheikh, is as it happens,
a professionally trained social anthropologist and therefore possesses specialised knowledge of Somali clanship). It should perhaps
be emphasised, here, that while being a Somali necessarily gives one
direct, personal experience of Somali kinship and clanship, this is not
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the same as an objective analytical understanding based on systematic
anthropological (or sociological) research.
Coming from a non-Somali, this may sound rather arrogant. But the
point I seek to make can perhaps be made clearer if I say that, as a British citizen, I have inevitably some direct experience of the British class
system. This, however, does not constitute a sound basis for claiming
that I am in any sense an expert on the subject. And, in fact, I would be
the first to acknowledge that I know little in a technical sense about
this topic. The fact of being British here is, in itself, thus scarcely a basis
for speaking authoritatively on “class.”
Having said all that, I agree with Prof. Samatar when he says that
Somali clans do not belong to different races. This is true in a scientific, biological sense. However, it is actually irrelevant, and misses the
whole point of the issues in racial (and inter-ethnic) relations generally. Race and inter-ethnic relations are not based on the actual genetic
make-up of those concerned. They are a matter of subjective ideas that
the protagonists involved hold about their identity, and their difference
from others. They are based on ideas in the mind, implanted by culture, and do not run in the blood whatever those who hold them may
think. For conduct to qualify as “racist” or informed by ethnicity, it has
to be based on ideas and theories about the nature and significance of
social differences which, although they have no basis in scientific reality, nevertheless powerfully motivate individual loyalty. The presumption, which Somalis manifestly hold, that those who share the same
genealogy and belong to the same “clan” (or “sub-clan”) should support each other at all times, and resort to nepotism utilising every possible connection for the benefit of their own clansmen at the expense
of members of other clans, is on a par with racism and ethnicity elsewhere. The guiding principle here is “my clansmen right or wrong.” This
I take it, is the allegation being advanced in this case against Mr. Yusuf
Gerad by the Applicants. That in their cultural universe this is how
they conceptualise it, this does not mean, of course, that Somalis are
actually genetically programmed to operate in this way. In other contexts,
prominent differences in physical features assist group stereotyping in
an obvious way, but they are not its essential basis. The basis always
lies in the feelings and assumptions which we hold about our own
identity and that of others, about our cultural theory of social relationships and political allegiances. Culture is here dominant, not biology,
even if as they are among the Somali, biological models (or idioms) of
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identity and behaviour (such as “clans”) are utilised to organise social
and political relations.
At some unknown point in history, the ancestors of the present Somali
people evidently decided to organise their social and political life on a basis of
family trees tracing descent in the male line. The earliest written accounts
of the Somalis we possess refer to this form of organisation. What in
other cultures is often simply a matter of family history is here much
more important since it constitutes the basis of social and political
identity. These Somali genealogies do not simply tell you where I come
from; much more significantly, they tell you who I am and how I relate
to others.
As I have tried to explain in my submission and reiterate above,
Somalis treat these genealogical distinctions like species or genus distinctions in nature, and regard them in short as natural divisions with
the biological basis expressed in their genealogies.
That they are not actually all biologically different in a scientific
sense is irrelevant, since their society is organised on the assumption
that this is the case. In the comparative sociological study of race and
ethnic relations, we always have to remember that actual genetics do
not matter, what matters is how people conceive of themselves and
others. Social (i.e. ideological) biology (rather than actual scientific
biology) is the issue here as elsewhere in race relations. From what he
writes, it would appear that Prof. Samatar does not understand this
distinction between cultural theory and scientific fact.
Interestingly, Prof. Samatar also cites the fact that his mother and
father belonged to different genealogical groups as evidence that clan
and lineage identity is neutral. This is a puzzling observation. Those
who study Somali and other similar clan systems professionally, know
that intermarriage (marital alliance) between distinct, and potentially
hostile, groups is one of the oldest strategies utilised in kinship systems
of this type to generate important compensating alliances. These marital connections are relied upon to facilitate inter-clan and inter-subclan relations. This is old hat in the anthropological study of Somali
kinship. And, as has been well-documented by Somali social anthropological research, these affinal ties have been widely used in this
familiar fashion in recent peace-making moves in Somaliland. In some
cultures, although I have not myself heard this said by Somalis, reflecting this practice people even say explicitly “We marry our enemies.”
I. M. Lewis FBA
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X. Samatar’s Final Response to Lewis
Samatar’s final written response systematically takes on Lewis’s accusations
and contentions. First, Samatar challenges Lewis to produce evidence substantiating the allegation that he is a friend of Garaad.59 Lewis’s intention
was to impress upon the judges that Somalis are unable to conduct themselves
professionally, as they lie to unjustly support not only their “clansmen” but
also their friends (note the equation between clansmen and friends). Thus,
Samatar is Westernized, in Lewis’s view, but still behaves like Lewis’s Somali
prototype—to support his presumed friend, Mr. Garaad. Second, Samatar
attempts to show how outdated Lewis’s reading of identity is by referring to
developments in social sciences and humanities over the past three decades.
Third, the response underscores Lewis’s bias in writing about phases of Somali
history and culture, intending to show that Lewis is indeed the Westerner who
has studied Somali culture and identity through Western and colonial lenses.
Samatar and the BBC legal team decided not to expose the serious contradictions between Lewis’s earlier writings about Somalis and his more recent ones
until the court cross-examination; this strategy would prove very effective
when the BBC’s lawyer cross-examined Lewis during court proceedings.
September 5, 2001
Dear Ms. Youngson:
It is not the first time that Professor Lewis has resorted to name-calling rather than engaging scholars who disagree with his ideas. For
example, he calls me a “westernized Somali, a friend of Yususf Garaad,
and supporter of TNG.” Such remarks add nothing, particularly when
they are false, to the expert discussion of Somali issues.
Professor Lewis’s tendency to use superficial analysis invariably
results in the wrong conclusions and observations. A wonderful example of this is his characterization of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan.
While most Somalis and scholars of Africa would consider him to
be Somalia’s premier freedom fighter against colonialism,60 Professor
Lewis exposes his historical blinders by writing:
Nearly 80 years ago, a brave servant of the empire called Richard Corfield
tried to bring order to the Somalis, when they were in rebellion under
a religious leader dubbed the Mad Mullah by the British. All Corfield got of
his pains was a bullet in the head in battle and a place in the epic poetry
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of Somalia—a bloodthirsty hymn to victory that has lived on in a society
steeped in antagonism to outsiders.* The first thing to underscore about the
Somalis is that they are not as other men.61 [Italics added.]

(*Ironically, Lewis contradicts himself about the attitude of
Somalis to outsiders, as he observed in an earlier writing that,
“Although the republic [Somalia] can as yet boast no counterpart
to the excellent Institute of Ethiopian Studies at Addis Ababa,
there can be few countries where the foreign researcher is more
welcome or given greater freedom to carry out his work without let or
hindrance.”62)
Is Somalia really a society that became “steeped in antagonism to
outsiders?” If so, how did this qualitative transformation occur? Such
a stereotypical statement cannot be a substitute for a careful and historically grounded analysis. Unfortunately, such unsubstantiated statements have been the trademark of some of Professor Lewis’s work.
Let me turn to Professor Lewis’s six major assertions in his third
submission:
1. He claims that I am a friend of Mr. Yusuf Garaad. Professor Lewis
has no knowledge of my private life and I would like him to provide
the evidence necessary to substantiate this declaration. As Lewis
provides no other corollary to this assertion and its supposed value,
I can only assume he is making this reference to friendship to discredit my professional credibility.
2. Professor Lewis indicates that he knows of no geographer who is an
expert on African kinship and clanship. Lewis’s difficulty, as always,
is that he confuses and equates politics and identity formation with
genealogical structures. His genealogy-based thesis is mechanically
deterministic and permits little leeway for human agency and social
change. In other words, his stance implies that one does not need
to study the dynamics of a society and its larger context to better understand the shifting nature of politics. For Lewis, genealogy
alone is enough.
Scholarly literature in the last three decades has convincingly
shown the bankruptcy of this approach.63 The issue at hand is
the politics of identity formation, and this has been the epicenter
of debates in the social sciences and humanities for the last two

63

Bildhaan Vol. 10

decades. Geographers have contributed to this subject in no small
way (see various issues of the journal Political Geography). Lewis’s
submission indicates that he is not aware of these developments
or by his silence refuses to give them credence. The first possibility
offers the unsettling picture of a scholar no longer engaged with
ideas. The second possibility is just as unpalatable.
Out-dated anthropological literature on “traditional” genealogy
no longer provides the appropriate framework for understanding
identity politics in contemporary Somalia and Africa. Historians,
political scientists, geographers and even anthropologists use a variety of theoretical tools to explain the dynamics of identity formation.
Political economy and social theory are two of the conceptual tools
scholars have used in recent decades. Events in the last decade have
sustained the validity of my approach to Somali Studies. My first
major publication (1989) predicted the watershed EVENT in contemporary Somali political history: the disintegration of the Somali
state. Professor Lewis failed to anticipate this historic benchmark
due to the serious limitations of his approach to Somali Studies.
3. Professor Lewis asserts that I have not done extensive systematic
field research in rural Somali society on this topic. It is true that I
did not focus my attention on genealogy and clans in my fieldwork.
However, I have done more extensive fieldwork on Somalia’s rural
economy and national political economy than Lewis did in his entire
career (see his CV for field visits). Lewis’s last significant fieldwork
(3 months) took place nearly thirty years ago. Studying rural society
in the context of a vastly changing world is substantially more complex than choreographing the structure of genealogy.
4. Professor Lewis indicates that although I have direct personal experience of Somali culture, I lack the expertise. He then goes on to
accuse me of being westernized—the implication of which he does
not make explicit. Extrapolating from his stance, given the fact that
Professor Lewis hails from the Western world, would it not also be
appropriate to say that his perspective is “westernized?” Whatever
Lewis’s intentions are in such name-calling, the reality is that he
cannot match my grasp of Somali culture, poetry, and politics.
Despite the years Professor Lewis has spent studying Somali
society, this effort has been conducted indirectly, through translators and
English-speaking Somalis [Italics added]. I believe that fluency in the
Somali language is an important indicator of Lewis’ capacity to be a
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seasoned analyst of Somali culture, identity and politics. Moreover,
Professor Lewis also argues that my understanding of Somali culture and identity is akin to his lay person’s knowledge of the British
class system. This is the height of arrogance. I have been a student of
Somali political economy for nearly 17 years. In contrast, Lewis has
not studied British society and hence the comparison is at best irrelevant. Finally, no competent scholar of the British class system will
take seriously someone who has not engaged in serious fieldwork
on the subject for nearly three decades.
In the end, the tragedy of Professor Lewis’s submission and his
current stance is that it exposes him as a scholar on Somalia that
has lived off the contribution of a small endowment to the knowledge base of Somali Studies made at a time when there was a paucity of highly trained social scientists. The conditions have changed
in the last two decades, as more Somali and non-Somali scholars
on Somalia have emerged. Consequently, the knowledge base of
Somali Studies and African Studies has expanded. It is inevitable,
then, as understanding and greater insight emerged, Lewis’s words
would no longer be the ruling ideas. It is also not surprising that this
turn of events would result in Professor Lewis demonstrating great
discomfort with the growing challenge younger scholars pose, as I
believe his submission reflects.
5. Professor Lewis’s first and third submissions are contradictory. He
argued in the first submission that “I would prefer to say that clans
represent invisible lines of distinction within the Somali ‘nation’
and, since they are based on genealogies and descent, have a biological basis comparable to racial distinctions (emphasis added).” Professor
Lewis changes his view in the third submission and reverts to a
social constructionist approach to race and ethnic issues—a position
I made clear in my second testimony and before I had access to Professor Lewis’s third submission.
Finally, my brief is to provide a scholarly comment on “whether
Somali genealogy and identity forms fall within the purview of the
British Race Relations Act of 1976” and not on the validity of the
court case. Professor Lewis’s comments indicate that he is a partisan
in the case. He seems eager to render judgment without the benefit
of due process. While Professor Lewis’s understanding of Somali
politics and identity may pass as an expert opinion in the eyes of
those who are unfamiliar with Somali society, rigorous and objec-
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tive analysis would show that his understanding of this society is
quite rudimentary for someone who was in the field for so long. His
assertion that I do not understand the distinction between cultural
theory and scientific fact is nonsense. The source of confusion is his
notion that genealogy is the constant in Somali culture and politics,
and by association Somali identity.
6. Professor Lewis is unable to grasp the significance of inter-marriage relations between individuals of various Somali genealogical groups as a social strategy that is a central part of the complex
process of identity formation in the Somali society, e.g., the example of my mother and father, who hail from different genealogical groups. Contrary to Lewis’s claim, I never heard of the notion
that my mother was “marrying the enemy.” I asked my 80-year-old
mother about this notion last week (late August 2001) when I was in
Somalia and she ridiculed the idea.
Inter-marriage between different genealogical groups has been a
characteristic feature of Somali communities and where I grew up.
Members of these communities did not see such unions as a way of
containing latent and inherent animosities, but as a means of developing wide ranging social networks that they could tap on for different occasions. Professor Lewis confuses a small number of high
profile cases, where marriages were consummated to reduce conflict. These cases are more the exception rather than the rule. Most
inter-marriages are products of the mundane demands of everyday
life and the desires of individuals. Professor Lewis’s misreading is
the consequence of his approach that is akin to an equation with a
single variable: genealogy.
In conclusion, I believe it is important to remember that a scholar
is someone who analytically examines the information and data collected, constantly questioning the validity of the assumptions made in
the analysis and testing the credibility of existing and new theories that
have been offered as explanation for a particular reality or result. This
basic tenet of scholarship has eluded Professor Lewis’s work on Somali
politics and identity. It is why he continues to use the outmoded theory of genealogy to explain current realities and why his conclusions,
therefore, are superficial and erroneous.
Sincerely,
Abdi I. Samatar
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XI. The Lawyers’ Final Representations
At the tribunal proceedings, the applicants’ and respondents’ lawyers
adopted the same strategy: to undermine the credibility of each expert
witness’s testimony. The BBC’s attorney, Mr. Gerard Clarke, focused on
two major areas of Lewis’s presentation. First, he attempted to show
that Lewis’s earlier scholarship diametrically contradicted his court
testimony and his recent polemical works. He cited Lewis’s 1981 (1993)
publication dealing with the ethnic character of Somalis: “With a total
population of some five million, the Somali form a single ethnic unit in
the Horn of Africa…”64 He also quoted from Lewis’s 1988 re-publication of A Modern History of Somalia:
While the Somali draw many of their distinctive characteristics, especially their strong egalitarianism, their political acumen and opportunism, and their fierce traditional pride and contempt for other nations
from their own traditional culture, they also owe much to Islam. And
it is typical of their mutual dependence upon those two founts of their
culture that the highly pragmatic view of life which nomadism seems
to foster…Above all, Islam adds depth and coherence to these common
elements of traditional culture which, over and above their many sectional divisions, unite Somalis and provide the basis for their national
consciousness. Although the Somali did not traditionally form a unitary
state, it is this heritage of cultural nationalism which, strengthened by
Islam, lies behind Somali nationalism today.65

Mr. Clarke was able, through cross-examination, to force Lewis to
admit that stark contradictions existed between his most recent claims
and the work he produced for most of his academic career prior to
the mid-1980s. Clarke’s second strategy was to show the court that
Lewis was not just an expert on the Somali clan system but an active
partisan in the BBC case. Lewis’s petitions to BBC authorities, accusing Garaad of favoring reports from the south and marginalizing the
north in the Somali Section’s news, were made available to the court.
Clarke’s extensive and aggressive cross-examination exposed the great
pains Lewis had taken to cover up his partisan involvement in the case.
Third, the respondents’ lawyer used Lewis’s own early works to show
that Somalis are a single ethnic group. At the end, Lewis’s last refuge
was to argue that Somali genealogical groups belong to different races.
The BBC’s lawyers felt so confident after the first three hours of cross-
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examination that they privately suggested to the applicants’ attorneys
that they withdraw the case, which the applicants’ lawyers rejected.
The applicants’ attorney, Ms. Catrin Lewis (no relation to Professor Lewis) sought to show that Samatar was not an expert on Somali
identity (read “clan system”) and that his testimony was dependent on
his personal experience as a native Somali and on his political orientation. Ms. Lewis noted that Samatar was not a “typical Somali” and that
“by refusing to use the word ‘clan,’ he was trying to deny it. This was
something no Somali could do.” This was of course the classic colonial
approach: to delegitimize independent-minded local people who do
not accept terminology imposed by others. Neither of the two Lewises
tried to locate contradictions in Samatar’s scholarship during the crossexamination. More critically, the judges noted the illogic of their claims
that Samatar’s testimony was simultaneously based on native/personal
experience and that, at the same time, he is too Westernized to assess
the clan system appropriately.
What follows is an abbreviated verbatim reproduction of the two
lawyers’ final submissions. That of Ms. Lewis, the applicants’ lawyer,
follows Mr. Clarke’s presentation. Both lawyers begin their presentations by reviewing the pertinent section 3(1) of the British Race Relations Act (RRA).
XII. Mr. Clarke’s Submission
MOHAMMED SHEIKH and others
and BBC SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RESPONDENT
1.

Discrimination on “racial grounds” means discrimination on
grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origin:
RRA section 3(1).

2.

In the present case we can discount colour, nationality and national
origin as possible bases for discrimination claims. The Applicants
must show that each clan (and each sub-clan and each sub-sub
clan, and so on) is a separate race or a separate ethnic group. The
concept of an ethnic group is explained in Mandla v. Dowell Lee
[1983] IRLR 209.

3.

For a group to constitute an ethnic group for the purposes of the
Race Relations Act, it must regard itself, and be regarded by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics.
It is essential that there is (1) a long shared history, of which the

68

Abdi Ismail Samatar

group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the
memory of which keeps it alive; (2) a cultural tradition of its own,
including family and social customs and manners, often but not
necessarily associated with religious observance. In addition, there
are other relevant characteristics, one or more of which will commonly be found and will help to distinguish the group from the
secondary community; (3) either a common geographical origin
or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (4) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common
literature peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different
from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community
surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a
dominant group within a larger community.
4.

In the light of the evidence, it is not at all clear how the Applicants can even attempt to bring themselves within any applicable
category under section 3(1). When the case began it looked as
though the Applicants were contending that the clans are distinct
ethnic groups, on the basis of diverse cultural identities, but their
own expert disavowed this proposition. That he did so is perhaps
unsurprising in the light of his own writings, which emphasise the
homogeneous nature of Somali culture and the strong sense of a
distinct Somali nationality and cultural tradition

5.

The evidence given by Professor Lewis was in many ways unsatisfactory: His reports for the purposes of this case are contradictory to his earlier writings. The contradiction may be explained by
Professor Lewis having taken a partisan position on the underlying subject matter of this litigation. He accepts the Applicants’
contention that appointments to BBC positions have been made on
a clan basis. That alone ought to disqualify him from acting as an
independent expert in this case, and substantially devalues his evidence.

6.

Most strikingly, Professor Lewis said that “outsiders cannot see
clans.” The Applicants confirmed this: A Somali person cannot
tell what clan another Somali person belongs to without asking
directly or indirectly or making enquiries of others.

7.

This evidence is fatal to a case based on ethic grouping. Mandla v.
Dowell Lee requires that an ethnic group regard itself and be regarded
by others as a distinct community.

69

Bildhaan Vol. 10

8.

The Applicants’ own evidence was remarkable in that it confirmed
the absence of the cultural upon distinctiveness which they had
appeared to base their case. They confirmed that variations in, for
example, language, were regional, that stories varied regionally,
that camel brands varied from region to region, and even from
family to family.

9.

It was also apparent that an individual can choose to identify him
or herself by reference to a clan, sub-clan, sub-sub clan, and so
on, depending upon the context for which he or she is identifying
himself. The sub divisions extend, as one of the Applicants said, to
the “thirtieth generation.”

10. It is plain from the Applicants’ own evidence that a Somali clan,
sub clan etc is no more an distinct ethnic group than is a particular Highland Scottish clan, or Sept. Ultimately, clans are extended
family groups. Doubtless they have their traditions, but they all
operate within the broad and generally homogenous Somali culture.
11. Applying the Mandla v. Dowell Lee criteria:
(1) clans have shared histories, but these are not distinct to each
clan: a sub clan or sub-sub clan of, say, the Darod, will have
part of its history in common with other Darod clans. A sub-sub
clan will share part of its history with a sub-clan, and so on. The
sub or sub-sub clans’ distinct history is no more than extended
family history or genealogy.
(2) The evidence shows that clans do not have cultural traditions
of their own. At best, they have family based or regional based
variations upon wider cultural traditions.
(3) The clans all come from the geographical region of Somalia.
They do not come from precisely defined parts of that region.
Professor Lewis’ maps are conjectural and have no statistical
basis. Each “top level” clan claims descent from a single common ancestor, but beyond that, according to Professor Lewis,
they all claim descent from Arabian ancestors closely associated with the Prophet Mohammed. Sub clans and sub-sub clans
share common ancestors with others sub-sets of their main clan
groupings.
(4) They all speak the same language, with regional and dialectical
variations.
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(5) Until recently there was no written literature, but a strong oral
tradition. The oral tradition is common to Somalis, not clan specific.
(6) The clans all have the same religion: Islam, which has traditionally operated as a cohesive force in Somali society. No clan claims a
religion distinct from that of other clans.
(7) None of the clans is an oppressed minority or a dominant
group. Clan members may oppose one another in political debate
or political violence, but cross-clan disputes are also common.
Contemporary Somali politics features members of the same clans
on opposing factions.
12. If the Applicants cannot make their case on the basis of ethnic origin, they are forced to argue that the clans, sub clans etc are separate races. This argument is hopeless: the experts agree that there is
no biological basis for claims by different clans to exist as different
races.
13. Professor Lewis attempted to make a case that, despite the absence
of an objective biological basis for claimed racial identity, it is
enough that people believe themselves to be racially distinct from
one another. This is really an argument for a form of culturally
based ethnicity, in the Mandla v. Dowell Lee sense, but, as set out
above, the clans fail the Mandla v. Dowell Lee test.
14. Also, on the basis of this variant of the case, each family which
claims descent from a particular ancestor belongs to a race distinct
from that of any other family. The absurdity of this proposition is
self evident.
15. Lastly, the Applicants’ own evidence indicated that “clanism” is
something which has become a prominent force in Somali society
since the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s. Even if,
therefore, it is thought that clans have become more distinctive
and important in recent history, this is not a basis for a finding
that they are races or ethnic groups. On this, see Crown Suppliers
v. Dawkins [1993] ICR 517, in which the recency of the emergence
of Rastafarianism was one of the factors leading to the conclusion
that Rastafarians did not constitute a distinct ethnic (as opposed to
religious) group.
16. The Applicants claims under the RRA should be dismissed.
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Gerard Clarke
Blackstone Chambers
Blackstone House
Temple, London
XIII. Ms. Lewis’s Submission
MOHAMED HAMUD SHEIKH and other Applicants
AND THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Respondent
3.66 The situation of these applicants clearly falls within the mischief
that the Act is intended to prevent full square. It is a situation where
it is alleged that one Somali will discriminate against another on
the grounds of clan membership. This would not however lead to
a situation where an unsuspecting employer with no knowledge of
Somali society would fall foul of the Act as it is necessary to have
the understanding of clan culture or to be from a clan to be able
to discriminate for your clan or against another. The complaint in
these applications being that none of the applicants were from the
Hawiye clan but that all the successful candidates were from that
clan and that these applicants were not selected because they had
been discriminated against on the grounds of their clan membership by a member of the Hawiye clan.
Are Somali clans ethnic groups for the purposes of the RRA 1976?
4.

The test under the RRA of whether a group constitutes an ethnic
group is set out in the case of Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] IRLR 209,
at 211 paragraph 11.

5.

Somali clans satisfy the first test (1) set out above: each clan has
its own history in the form of its lineage and with stories relating
to its own ancestors; each clan member is taught this at his or her
mother’s knee and the consciousness of being distinct from other
clans stems from this. There is some overlap between this and having a cultural tradition of its own but there is further evidence that
they satisfy the second test as well, each clan has its own saints
which are peculiar to that clan and are venerated only by members
of that clan, with clan members making pilgrimages to their clan
saints’ shrines and holding ceremonies at which songs of veneration to that particular saint are performed.
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6.

There is also evidence to satisfy some of the other “optional” tests,
for example (3) and (4), (5) and (7). The clans have their own geographical regions from which they originate and they descend
from a particular named common ancestor. The clans have a common language in that each member of the clan speaks the same
language, Somali, although this is not a language peculiar to the
clan. Lord Fraser’s test does not require it to be so.

7.

The clans have their own common oral literature with a body of
stories, poems and songs celebrating the clan ancestors which is
peculiar to that clan. All the clans follow Islam and to that extent
each clan is not different to the other clans around it. The different
clans may be a minority group or a dominant group depending on
where a clan member is within the country.

8.

These differences are so obvious and inherent to Somalis that it is
difficult to describe—but clan identity is all pervasive. It is impossible to understand or analyse Somali society without reference to
and understanding of Somali clans and their key role unique to
that society.

13. In Commission for Racial Equality v. Dutton [1989] IQB 783 the nature
of the evidence relevant to the question of ethnic group was considered and it was accepted that gypsies were an ethnic group
even though some members had given up the distinctive lifestyle.
The Experts
14. Professor Lewis’s expertise is in the field of anthropology. He is
a renowned scholar of Somali society and culture, anthropology
being “the study of mankind, especially of its societies and customs” (the Concise Oxford Dictionary). Whereas Professor Samatar
is a professor of geography, “the science of the earth’s surface,
from, physical features, natural and political divisions, climate,
productions, population, etc.” (Concise Oxford Dictionary).
15. Professor Samatar’s observations are purely anecdotal and are
clearly influenced by his own political perspective. His experience
of schooling in Somalia is from a time when clans had been buried
in the name of scientific socialism and also from a time when the
Somali language had a written form and clan stories were written
down and disseminated to other clans in schools. This does not
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mean that those stories do not belong to the particular clans or
come from that clan‘s particular culture and form part of it.67
16. Professor Lewis has studied the customs and literature of the different clans and his work pre and post dates the burial of clans and
the concept of clannism; he was clear that each clan has its own
stories and poets and its own saints that were venerated. Professor Lewis was also able to point to the earliest written reference to
the different Somali clans as dating back to the 16th century. Clan
identity and its role in Somali society cannot therefore be called a
modern invention.
17. Professor Lewis’s deep understanding of Somali society and the
nature of Somali clans and how they operate within Somali society
does not mean that he has an axe to grind. In fact he expressed
himself to be a long standing supporter of the BBC World Service and to have campaigned on its behalf. The fact that he has
expressed his genuine concern at the perceived lack of balance
in the Somali service does not undermine his independence, but
rather shows that he has a genuine and independently held view
as to the nature and role of clans and their importance in Somali
society.
18. I would ask you to read the whole of Professor Lewis’s report
found at pages 14–30 at the bundle and his further report at pages
56–60 and to accept their contents. In particular at page 20, Appendix 1 to his first report at paragraph 2, sets out key factors that
address and satisfy the test (1) and (2) identified by Lord Fraser.
These elements of differentiation are present on a closer examination of an apparently homogenous society; the term ethnic group
is not used in a scientific sense in the legislation nor is it a term
of art. A person can belong to more than one racial group under
the legislation. The fact that each clan has similar structures and
organises itself in a way that is similar to other clans (giving an
overall impression of homogeneity) does not prevent each being
a different ethnic group under the Act, the question is can the
group show that it is a separate and distinct community by virtue
of characteristics which are commonly associated with common
racial origin (Mandla v. Dowell Lee). Professor Lewis’s description
of Somali clans being based on their belief or perception of descent
from a single common ancestor led him to the view that they were
in fact closer to the definition of race than anything else. This does
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not mean they do not have the necessary characteristics for an ethnic group under the Act but, rather, points strongly to clans falling
under that definition.
19. Each individual applicant is conscious of him or herself as belonging to their own individual clan and subclan and retains the clan
history in respect of their own lineage. Professor Lewis, who has
studied the different clans and their oral traditions, was clear that
each had their own historical tradition and own specific saints
particular to that clan as well as there being some free floating
saints common to all clans. The cult of the clan saint was kept alive
by veneration and pilgrimage to a shrine of the particular clan’s
saint. This was supported by the evidence of Mohamed Sheikh,
Mohamed Dualeh and Mustafa Hussein, who each referred to having their own clan saint, and Jawahir Elmi who referred to her
own clan’s stories and poems. Shamsa Ahmed is from the Shiqal
clan, which has its own particular tradition due to being considered to have a special religious role and so is again distinguished
from other tribes. Each applicant was clear to which ancestor they
traced their founding line back.
20. The Somali clans, or clan-families, are identified as Darod, Dir,
Isaq, Hawiye, Rahanweyn and Digil and each is recognised by each
other as separate and distinct. A Darod clan member considers him
or herself to be Darod and not Dir and would be recognised by a
Dir member as Darod. Within Somali society each person is placed
by reference to his or her clan membership by their own clan and
members of other clans and is recognised to belong to the community of that particular clan family. That they can also trace their
line down to more immediate ancestors does not detract from this
identity as the key clan families are recognisable and recognised as
such within Somali society.
21. In my submission the applicants’ have shown that they satisfy the
relevant requirements of an ethnic group on the balance of probabilities and I would ask the tribunal to find in their favour on the
preliminary issue.
Catrin Lewis
2 Garden Court
Temple
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XIV. The Tribunal’s Decision
The court made its ruling, and two factors informed the tribunal’s decision. First, Lewis’s lack of objectivity and his partisan involvement in
the case troubled the judges. In its decision, the tribunal quotes Lewis’s
own testimony to underscore his prejudice:
As you can readily imagine, with the best will in the world, such connections, in the Somali perception, would make it very difficult for the
Somali Service to present current Somali news in a completely neutral
fashion. The situation is compounded by recently reported appointments to the Somali Section which appear to have altered its clan balance
in favor of this grouping (Employment Tribunals, London, Case No.
6000066/02 & others, p. 5).68

The judges underscored their skepticism about Lewis’s impartiality
by noting that, “we accept Lewis is an eminent authority in the field,
but the above-quoted remarks do cause us some concern when considering the objectivity of the evidence.” Second, the tribunal accepted
Lewis’s tactical agreement, under the pressure of cross-examination,
that Somali clans do not constitute distinct ethnic groups. However,
the court found wanting Lewis’s other claim, that Somali genealogical
groups constitute different racial groups. After carefully examining
the evidence, the tribunal concluded that Somali clans do not meet
the requirements of the RRA. The court commented, “in both the two
essential characteristics we conclude that the applicants fail Lord Fraser’s test. However for the sake of completeness we shall consider
the other relevant characteristics which he identified.” The tribunal’s
ultimate conclusion, after examining the Act’s remaining features, was
this:
[B]ecause of the disparate nature of the Somali clan system, the fact that
it is constantly watered down by the facility of intermarriage between
clans, and the failure to satisfy most of the tests laid down by Lord Fraser, we are led to the inevitable conclusion that the Somali clan system is
not of a sufficient racial flavour to bring it within the express provisions
or indeed the mischief of the Race Relations Act 1976. The claims of race
discrimination brought against the respondents are therefore dismissed
(p. 9).
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After considering all the Act’s features, the arguments, and the evidence presented pertaining to Somali genealogical groups’ ethnic and
racial nature in the context of the British Race Relations Act 1976, the
tribunal unambiguously resolved as follows:
The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that ‘the membership of
clans in Somali society does not amount to membership of a racial or
ethnic group within the meaning of section 1 and 3 of the Race Relations
Act 1976. The claims of race discrimination are therefore dismissed in
respect of all the applicants’ (p. 1).

Once the tribunal rendered its judgment pertaining to the racial and
ethnic basis of Somali “clans,” it then set a date to examine the remainder of the applicants’ claims that their dismissal amounted to “unfair
and a breach of contract.” Several months later, and after some consideration, the applicants withdrew their case; in exchange, the BBC did
not demand that the applicants cover its court costs.69
XV. Conclusion: Implications of the Decision
Two major threads run through critiques of certain Western writings
on the non-Western world. First, in recent years, that literature has
been accused of being Eurocentric, but others noted as much decades
ago, as Asad’s epigraph above indicates. Second, revisionist political
economists have established that the qualities Eurocentric literature
identified with “traditional societies” are of recent origin. For instance,
three decades ago Samir Amin’s insightful article established that the
so-called traditional societies under colonialism were anything but
traditional.70 Amin made his case by showing how colonial regimes
restructured and reoriented economies to serve European interests and
how such transformations distorted those societies’ internal dynamics
and logic. In a parallel fashion, Mamdani’s recent work has exposed
how colonialism distorted African cultural traditions and produced
political identities that nominally mimic the old culture but have essentially turned it inside out. Traditional social anthropological studies of
Somali society avoided engaging these Africanist ideas, pretending
that Somalis were a unique breed. As Lewis puts it, “the first thing to
underscore about the Somalis is that they are not as other men.”71 Some
perceptive colonial administrators of the former British Somaliland
doubted some of the main tenets of Lewisan anthropology long before
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Lewis came to Somalia with the advent of the Colonial Development
and Welfare Funds. In 1946, Brigadier General T. Fisher, then military
governor of Shiekh, pointed out the importance of careful analysis and
warned against imposing “standard” assumptions about tribal societies on Somalia:
A form of tribal administration would be particularly convenient in British Somaliland; but unfortunately, there are no indigenous institutions
here, nor are there any recognized leaders through whom authority
can be exercised. The unit may be said to be the family—if not the individual…If a tribal system ever existed in the Protectorate, which is not certain,
it was destroyed by the Egyptians who preferred direct control communicated
through Aqils who were government servants rather than tribal representatives,
to indirect control exercised through native chiefs…What the present government has been trying to do is to establish…some form of organized
responsibility, within the existing tribal or sectional structures…Parallel
with this, we have started some native courts, and town committees,
which are thought to be showing some promise, but they cannot be
said to be tribal in their composition; while the laws and regulations
which they administer are our laws and regulations—not indigenous
ones…Our type of administration requires trained and literate personnel…Somalis, though at present illiterate, are extremely quick to learn;
and when educated, show signs of being able to exercise authority; and
it is perhaps, be safe to say that that the most influential people in the
country today are clerks and traders… . It is therefore thought that the
natural leaders will be found as a product of our schools, rather than
as elected or self-appointed members of our tribes…We shall therefore
be well-advised not to try to impose on the Somalis a bogus system of native
authority, or delude ourselves that such a system can be artificially devised.72

Fisher, despite his patronizing and racist attitude, was sufficiently
perceptive to capture the distinctions between genealogy and “tribal
politics,” although the colonial government retained its commitment
to the latter. He recognized that colonial engineering of tribal politics
could not work in Somalia, as “traditional” tribal authority did not
exist in this society. The distinction between genealogy and tribalized
political authority, which Fisher recognized sixty years ago, has eluded
the leading Western anthropologist and many others writing on Somali
society.
Somali cultural and literary analysts have, at least since independence, warned about the human and social costs of fraudulent tribal
politics. Abdillahi Sultan Timaade’s insightful premonition and those
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of many other Somali cultural leaders, such as Hadrawi, have been
borne out. Here is an extract from Timaade’s prescient 1968 forecast:
Darajada Ilaahay ninkii doonaya helae
[Those who labour for Allah’s blessing earn it]
Nin ka duday distoorkiyo waxyiga diinti ka carrowye
[Those who stray from the constitution and the divine revelation remain
outside the faith]
Dugsi male qabyaaled waxay dumiso mooyaane
[Clanist politics provide no solace, it only destroys]
Hadayaan xumaanta iyo dilka daynin kala qaadka
[If we do not terminate this savagery and mend our ways]
Dibaddan ka joogna sharciga dacadda Illahe
[We are beyond Allah’s grace]
Danbarkeedu waa jahanamiyo dogobki naareede
[And its reward is Jahanama, the cruelest purgatory of all]

Rather than engage the wisdom of Somalia’s leading cultural practitioners or Africanist academic analysts by challenging the sectarian
political tide that engulfed the Somali people, Lewis saw the crisis as
an opportunity to secure his legacy by imposing his theory on Somalia. As a result, he has tirelessly campaigned to convince international
donors, particularly the European Union, that his clan-based vision
for Somalia is the most suitable and realistic plan for reconstructing
political authority in this society.73 The BBC case seemed a heaven-sent
opportunity for Lewis to ground his theory in British law, with the
hope the rest of the world, and particularly Europe, would follow suit.
His tactics in the case vindicate Asad’s description of anthropology as
an enterprise “carried out by Europeans, for a European audience of nonEuropean societies dominated by European power.”74 Lewis’s impudence in
dismissing Somali scholars and their reading of this society as atavistic, lacking in the objectivity of a European, or as too assimilated and
Westernized to understand traditional Somali cultural values, confirms
earlier critiques of social anthropology. The only “real” Somalis are
those who adhere to Lewis’s master narrative.
What might have been the effects on Somali life if the tribunal’s verdict had been for the applicants and thus sanctioned Lewis’s argument?
At least four major potential impacts can be discerned. Conceptually,
the ruling would have reinforced the notion, present in much of the
literature, that genealogy is politics and that a Somali’s political identity
is fixed from the day of his or her birth. Second, an affirmative deci-
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sion would have set a critical legal precedent in the United Kingdom,
and ultimately in the European Union, that Somalis consist of distinct
ethnic and racial groups. This would have enhanced the credibility of
sectarian assertions that Somalia should be divided into clan fiefdoms,
which would institutionalize ethnic politics.
Third, a verdict in favor of the applicants would have established
clan representation as the foundational criterion for allocating employment opportunities in the Somali world. This would relegate merit to
the professional dustbin and would have unimaginable consequences
for public life. A genealogy-based standard would reinforce current
staffing patterns in public enterprises that privilege clan identity over
calibre and citizenship. The current deployment of a clanist yardstick to
allocate opportunities has already created new fault lines between and
within communities, as donors succumb to sectarian political activists’
wishes. Non-governmental organizations, U.N. agencies, European
Union representatives, and many other donors use clan identity as a
litmus test in employing Somali staff inside and outside of the country.
The first question they ask a candidate is, “What your clan identity?”
Only those who are deemed to “belong” are employed, thus reinforcing social fragmentation. This practice is not limited to employment;
it also extends to the provision of social and humanitarian services.
Galkayo, a town in northeastern Somalia, provides a telling example
of the problems created by using a genealogy-based standard to allocate public goods. The civil war has torn Galkayo into two parts, each
ruled by a sectarian leader. When a Swedish NGO approached the
town about constructing a health clinic in the community, each group
demanded a separate health facility. The NGO yielded to the ultimatum and established two clinics where one would have sufficed.75
Ironically, enhancing genealogical division and locking people into
clan ghettos was at the centre of the colonialists’ divide-and-conquer
strategy. Today, international humanitarian and development agencies
in Somalia indulge in this practice with impunity. In so doing, these
agencies fuel a sectarian rather than a civic agenda, despite their claims
to the contrary.
Fourth, an affirmative ruling for the applicants would have sanctioned the notion that Somalis cannot assess one another professionally, even in British institutions such as the BBC, and will always
favor individuals from their own genealogical group even when they
are unqualified. Lewis refers to this idea in his presentation when
he writes, “Recently reported appointments to the Somali Section…
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appear to have altered its clan balance in favour of this grouping” (emphasis added). It is germane to note that Lewis had never criticized the
BBC Somali Service for the clan imbalance of its Somali employees
prior to this case, despite the existence of such an imbalance. If this
advice were accepted, it would undo the progress made by the BBC
World Service in giving skilled speakers of native languages opportunities to head various language departments. Had Lewis’s arguments
prevailed, only non-Somalis would be able to evaluate Somalis’ qualifications, and “native” Somalis would never be able to overcome their
ingrained “malady.” This assessment may seem harsh, but the record
demands such a judgment. For example, the EU-sponsored study that
Lewis directed contains not a single Somali-authored chapter. None of
the eight contributors, apart from Lewis, had done any prior work in
Somalia. The implicit message of Lewis’s report is that Somalis are analytically incapable of contributing to a report of such national import
because of their clanist tendencies; this perhaps is unsurprising, given
his claim that a Somali’s guiding principle is “my clansmen right or
wrong.” Alternatively, Lewis may also be suggesting that Somalis of
this caliber do not exist. The obvious conclusion, since it is known that
the latter suggestion is erroneous, is that only non-Somalis of British
or European extraction have the knowledge, wisdom, and analytical
sagacity to discern the Somali people’s future. Accepting Lewis’s proposal by genealogizing political identity will deepen the political and
institutional legacy of colonialism and push Somalia further down the
slippery slope, which Timaade warned against nearly forty years ago,
and whose ultimate manifestation is the likes of the Rwandan genocide.
Notes
1. Samatar and Samatar 2003.
2. Heinrich 1997; Svensson 2004.
3. It seems that the new ethnic divisions are similar to the old colonial indirect rule. I
thank Dr. Luckman of the University of Sussex for pointing this out. Aalen 2002.
4. A. I. Samatar 2004; Turton 2006.
5. Giley 2004; Welsh 1996; Yeros 1999.
6. Asad 1973.
7. Mamdani 1996.
8. Mamdani 2004.
9. Mamdani 2004, p. 5.
10. Ibid., p. 6.
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11. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
12. Vail 1989; Abdi I. Samatar 1989.
13. Mkandawire 1999.
14. Odhiambo 2004.
15. Early exceptions include Swift (1977), Aronson (1980), Gesheckter (1982), and Cassanelli (1982).
16. The exception here is Abdi Shiekh Abdis (1977).
17. Ahmed I. Samatar 2002.
18. A. I. Samatar 1989.
19. Abdi I. Samatar 1989, p. xiii.
20. Cassanelli 1982; Besteman and Cassanelli 1996; Little 2003; and Menkhaus 1989.
21. Kapteijns 1995; Kapteijns and Ali 1999; Besteman 1999; and Abdi 2006.
22. Abdi I. Samatar 1989; Abdi I. Samatar 1992.
23. Afrax 1994; Ahmed I. Samatar 1995; Abdi I. Samatar 1997.
24. Ahmed 1995.
25. Mukhtar 1995.
26. Ahmed I. Samatar 1994.
27. Afrax 1994.
28. Kapteijns 1994, 1995.
29. Abdi 2006.
30. Besteman 1998, 1999.
31. Besteman and Cassanelli 1996.
32. Peter Little 2003.
33. Heinrich 1997; Abdi I. Samatar 1997, 2001.
34. The late Somali lawyer and journalist, Yusuf Duhul, who was the most articulate
critic of the Somali government in the 1960s, pointed to the importance of keeping ethnic
politics out of public affairs. “One thing is indisputably certain,” he wrote. “It had never
even occurred to the Aden/Abdirazak team to look into the possibilities of applying
the norms of Somali tribalism to the state, or its institutions and functions. One reason
for such disregard of any thought is that the applying of tribal norms and criteria to
the state and its institutions would have been then a flagrant violation of the Somali
constitution…Paradoxically, the principal target of the Dalka’s verbal violence were the
governmental team of the first president…and his choice of Prime Minister…whose
government is now accepted by all to have been the best Somalis ever had. Dalka itself
was not oblivious, even then, of the fact. Stating it openly, however, would have been
as despicable and venal…Dalka then noted [that]…the basic distinguishing feature of
the…team was the fundamental factor underlying the political framework…[it was]
consensual…One of the results of such consensual approach was the removal of the
need to resort to political violence. Hence, [neither] the government nor its opponents
considered intimidation as an instrument to use in the political arena…The advantage of
this system of mutual tolerance…included…freedom from physical intimidation and the
resulting worry about their personal safety. Consequently, one of the common sights [in
Mogadishu] of the period was to see the PM…sitting in Juba Hotel, sipping a cup of tea
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while dueling verbally with the critics of his government. He would, at the end, calmly
walk, usually alone, to his house…An equally familiar sight of the period was to find the
President of the Republic…performing his Maqreb prayers, beside his small Fiat, alone
or with an ad hoc prayer gathering on the roadside. There just were no reasons then for
either of them to worry about his personal safety” (Duhul 1996, pp. 2–4).
35. Abdi I. Samatar 2001.
36. Lewis 1992, 1994.
37. Mamdani 1996.
38. The BBC staff union disliked long-running casual contracts and asked the head of
the Somali Section to terminate this practice. The latter did not like the idea of terminating casual staff; instead they simply rearranged the contract by reducing the number of
casual contracts. Yusuf Garaad became head of the Service and inherited the decision to
terminate the casual contracts. Abdillahi told Garaad to terminate all the casual staff, but
the latter declined to do so (Haji 2005).
39. Abdillahi Haji indicated that there were no disagreements between him and Garaad
over the short-list of candidates (Haji 2005).
40. Blackburn 2002; Garaad 2002.
41. Blackburn 2002.
42. In September 1999, two applicants told me that Lewis had encouraged them to do
this.
43. Race Relations Act 1976 (U.K.), c. 74.
44. Ibid., s2 Q91.
45. Lewis rewrote his first submission after Samatar responded to his original version.
The second version is much longer than the first but does not differ in any substantive
way. This second version is not included in the paper; for the sake of fairness, Samatar’s
response to the second draft is not included either.
46. Samatar and the respondent’s lawyers decided not to forward Samatar’s last word
until the court hearing began.
47. As late as 1993, Lewis wrote that, “Somali form a single ethnic unit in the Horn of
Africa stretching from the Awash Valley…to beyond the Tana river” (Lewis 1993, p. 9).
48. Lewis revised his first submission only after Samatar responded to it. The resubmission is not included, as nearly all of its substance is redundant.
49. Here Lewis clearly equates genealogy with politics and turns Somali history into a
tomb. Lewis’s strategy seems similar to what Mamdani described as ethnic politics.
50. Lewis is unable to describe how the warlord- and big-men-driven ethnic politics
is democratic and why the majority of adults are disenfranchised in such operations.
Again, Lewis confuses past practices in pre-colonial times with contemporary operations
without attending to the qualitative transformation of these practices.
51. Given these claims, the author has no way of explaining the incredible number of
conflicts within genealogical groups in each region of the country.
52. Only in a few circumstances is this possible. For instance, it is in no way possible to
distinguish between Dulbahante and Habar Yonis names in northern Somalia.
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53. Lewis apparently missed the Somali Youth League (SYL), the most important political organization in Somali history. Many other political and social organizations have
had similar qualities.
54. Lewis is unable to fathom the fact that members of such a group, and most other
Somalis, do not deny their genealogy but reject political ethnicity as a method of conducting public affairs.
55. Again, this ahistorical interpretation of the Somali fails to see that under the aegis of
Xeer, Somalis did not twist justice to favour their closest genealogical kin. If the latter
were standard practice, then Xeer would have been a farce.
56. Lewis’s response to Garaad’s written testimony is not included in the text, but is
presented here for the sake of completeness. This passage from Lewis responds to Garaad’s remarks: “Mr. Yusuf Gerad, of course, writes as a journalist specialising in Somali
issues. Nevertheless, his statement contains a few errors and omissions, which, at the
risk of sounding censorious, it seems worth pointing out. Mogadishu is alas no longer
an ‘extremely multi-cultural city.’ Prior to the recent conquest of the city by Mr. Yusuf
Gerad’s Habar Ghedir clansmen, and even under the regime of the dictator Mohamed
Siad Barre, it was indeed so. But not now: it has become a predominantly Hawiye town
(or more accurately, ghost town). [On the] population [issue], there was actually a census, although its findings were much disputed, during the Siad era.
“Hargeisa does not accept that it any longer forms part of Somalia, having recently
held a national referendum (overwhelmingly supporting independence). Mr. Yusuf
Gerad is well aware of this as it was reported by the BBC (including his own service)
among other media.
“[On] Abdulqasim Salad Hassan’s ‘transitional government’: This organisation, which
has not been elected by the national Somali electorate, and is of debatable constitutional
legality, owes its existence to a UN sponsored conference held over many months at the
town of Arta in the neighbouring mini-state of Djibouti. It has no mandate outside the
small part of Mogadishu it might be said to precariously ‘control,’ and while vigorously
promoted by the UN secretariat, has failed to gain diplomatic recognition beyond a
section of the Arab League. Of the neighbouring east African states, Mr. Abdulqasim’s
regime has been officially recognised only by its patron Djibouti (whose President is
widely reported as sharing his business interests).
“The governments of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda who take a keen interest are
evidently waiting to see what happens, and have not recognised the ‘Arta’ faction as its
Somali opponents call it. This is also the position of the European Union whose member
states have so far not accorded Mr. Abdulqasim diplomatic recognition.
“[On] powerful warlords: it is not quite true that the two most powerful warlords in
Mogadishu belong to the same ‘subset’ as Mr. Abdulqasim (and Mr. Yusuf Gerad). They
actually belong to a different Habar Ghedir ‘sub-set,’ the Sa’ad lineage. Moreover, the
person who is generally regarded currently as the most powerful warlord is Muse Sudi
Yalahow who belongs not to Mr. Yusuf Gerad’s Hawiye sub-clan (the Habar Ghedir) but
to the Abgal sub-clan.
“[On the] definition of clans and their number: as indicated in my submission, I
would contest this assertion which seems poorly informed, and I find it interesting that
he only lists the majority clan in Somaliland (the Isaq) marginally. This is, I believe, quite
a common Hawiye (mis)perception.
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“[On] language: Mr. Yusuf Gerad is not a professional linguist and his remarks about
the ‘dialect’ spoken by the Digil-Mirifleh, as they call themselves, are somewhat inaccurate. The speech of this large and important Somali clan group (known as ‘Af Maymay’)
is about as different from ‘standard’ Somali as Portuguese is from Spanish. It and standard Somali are not actually mutually intelligible.
“[On] the Somali term for ‘clan’-‘qabaiil’: this Arabic loan-word is indeed used by
Somalis. But the commonest and more authentic Somali term is ‘tol.’
“[On] clan-based history: here Mr. Yusuf Gerad objects to my statements about the
clan-based organisation of saints’ cults. I think the facts are otherwise and more complex
than he appears to suppose and would refer him to my recent book Saints and Somalis.”
57. Lewis is apparently oblivious to the revolution in geographic thinking since the early
1970s and has not read much literature in other social sciences dealing with politics and
identity.
58. Note the contradiction between the italicized sentences.
59. For the record, Samatar met Garaad only once (in a coffee shop) before the BBC
approached him to join its team in the case.
60. Shiekh Abdi, 1991.
61. Lewis, 30 August 1992.
62. Lewis 1969.
63. Said 1978, 1981; Vail 1991; and Mamdani 1996.
64. Lewis 1981 [1993], p. 9.
65. Lewis 1988, p. 4.
66. I have eliminated Ms. Lewis’s discussion of the RRA section that identifies the key
yardsticks of the Act, as this information is included in Mr. Clarke’s submission (paragraphs 1 and 2).
67. This is an inaccurate statement, since Samatar did most of his primary and secondary
education before the establishment of Somali script, as well as before the so-called burial
of “clan politics.”
68. Note that Lewis assumed that employment of Somalis in the BBC should reflect “clan
balance.” Strangely enough, before the recent hires, the majority of the BBC’s Somali
employees were Northern Somalis; however, Lewis had never noticed this “imbalance”
before. I may also add that of the current employees, four were in Samatar’s cohort from
Amoud Secondary School.
69. Correspondence from BBC legal team to the author. The applicants confirmed this
information.
70. Amin 1972.
71. Lewis, 30 August 1992.
72. Brigadier General T. Fisher, Military Governor, Shiekh, to Foreign Office, 31 January
1946. (PRO, FO 1015/132.)
73. Lewis 1995, 2002.
74. Asad 1973.
75. Forum SYD 2002.
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